I’m rereading Meilander’s The Theory and Practice of Virtue and not enjoying it quite as much as I did last time. But it’s useful because it challenges my thinking at many turns, and I agree with many of his points–such as this quote from Mark Lilla: many people who take ethics courses “are learning a rather peculiar sort of philosophical discourse which allows them to make sophisticated excuses for their actions.” He’s apparently referring to public policy professionals, but as Meilander points out, the words apply to a much broader range of people.
One of the points I like early on talks about not focusing on the borderline cases but on “the continuities, the habits of behavior which make us the person we are. Not whether we should frame one innocent man to save five–but on the virtue of justice, with its steady, habitual determination to make space in life for the needs and claims of others…. An ethic of virtue turns away not only from an overemphasis on borderline cases but also from the concept of duty as the central moral concept. Being not doing takes center stage; for what what we ought to do may depend on the sort of person we are. What duties we perceive may depend upon what virtues shape our vision of the world.”
I totally agree, BUT I also think that one of philosophy’s problems over the centuries has been its emphasis on being rather than doing. Because ultimately, in my opinion, what you believe is one step away from pointless unless it influences what you do.